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Abstract
Deep convolutional neural networks (DCNNs) have achieved great success in image
classification, but they may be very vulnerable to adversarial attacks with small
perturbations to images. Moreover, the adversarial training based on adversarial
image samples has been shown to improve the robustness and generalization
of DCNNs. The aim of this paper is to develop a novel framework based on
information-geometry sensitivity analysis and the particle swarm optimization to
improve two aspects of adversarial image generation and training for DCNNs. The
first one is customized generation of adversarial examples. It can design adversarial
attacks from options of the number of perturbed pixels, the misclassification
probability, and the targeted incorrect class, and hence it is more flexible and
effective to locate vulnerable pixels and also enjoys certain adversarial universality.
The other is targeted adversarial training. DCNN models can be improved in
training with the adversarial information using a manifold-based influence measure
effective in vulnerable image/pixel detection as well as allowing for targeted attacks,
thereby exhibiting an enhanced adversarial defense in testing.
1 Introduction
Deep convolutional neural networks (DCNNs) have exhibited exceptional performance in image
classification [10, 7, 8], so they have been widely used in various real-world applications including
face recognition [27], self-driving cars [2], biomedical image processing [1], among many others
[18]. Despite of these successes, DCNN classifiers can be easily attacked by adversarial examples
with perturbations imperceptible to human vision [28, 6, 26]. This motivates the hot research in
adversarial attacks and defenses of DCNNs. See [29, 24] for reviews.
Existing adversarial attacks can be categorized into white-box, gray-box, and black-box attacks.
Adversaries in white-box attacks have the full information of their targeted DCNN model, whereas
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their knowledge is limited to model structure in gray-box attacks and only to model’s input and output
in black-box attacks. For instance, popular algorithms for white-box attacks include the fast gradient
sign method [6, 11], the projected gradient descent method [12], the Carlini and Wagner attack
[3], among many others [28, 22, 16]. Defensive techniques for those attacks include heuristic and
certificated defenses. Adversarial training is the current most successful heuristic defense approach
for improving the robustness of DCNNs, which simply incorporates adversarial samples into training
but has better numerical performance than certificated defenses [24].
In this paper, we propose a simple yet efficient framework for white-box adversarial image generation
and training for DCNN classifiers. For generating an adversarial example of a given image, our
framework provides user-customized options in the number of perturbed pixels, misclassification
probability, and targeted incorrect class. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first approach
rendering all the three desirable options. The freedom to specify the number of perturbed pixels
allows users to conduct attacks at various pixel levels such as one-pixel [26] and all-pixel [15] attacks.
Particularly, we adopt a recent perturbation-manifold based first-order influence (FI) measure [25]
to efficiently locate the most vulnerable pixels to increase the attack success rate. In contrast with
traditional Euclidean-space based measures such as Jacobian norm [21] and Cook’s local influence
measure [4], the FI measure captures the intrinsic change of the perturbed objective function [33, 34]
and shows better performance in detecting vulnerable images and pixels. Besides, our framework
allows users to specify the misclassification probability and/or the targeted incorrect class. The
prespecified misclassification probability is rarely seen in existing approaches, which produce
an adversarial example either near the model’s decision boundary [16, 19] or with unguaranteed
high confidence [20]. We tailor different loss functions accordingly to the three desirable options
and their combinations, and apply the particle swarm optimization (PSO) [9], a fast gradient-free
method, to obtain the optimal perturbation. Moreover, we observe that our perturbations with high
misclassfication probability can have certain adversarial universality [15] to images from different
classes. For adversarial training, in training data we further utilize the FI measure to identify
vulnerable images and their pixels that are prone to optional targeted classes. Then using our
customized generation approach yields an adversarial dataset for training. Experiments show that our
adversarial training significantly improves the robustness of pretrained DCNN classifers. Figure 1
illustrates the flowchart of our framework.
We notice that two recent papers [31, 17] also applied PSO to craft adversarial images. However, we
have intrinsic distinctions. First, the two papers focus on black-box attacks, but ours is white-box.
Article [31] only studied all-pixel attacks; although article [17] considered few-pixel attacks, but
searched in random chunks to locate the vulnerable pixels, we use the FI measure to directly discover
those pixels. Moreover, targeted attacks are not considered in [17], and both papers cannot prespecify
a misclassification probability for the generated adversarial example. Our framework is able to design
arbitrary-pixel-level, confidence-specified, and/or targeted/nontargeted attacks.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose a novel white-box framework for adversarial image generation and training for
DCNN classifiers. It provides users with multiple options in pixel levels, confidence levels,
and targeted classes for adversarial attacks and defenses.
• We adopt a manifold-based FI measure to efficiently identify vulnerable images and pixels
for adversarial perturbations.
• We design different loss functions adaptive to user-customized specifications and apply the
PSO, a fast gradient-free optimization, to obtain optimal perturbations.
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework via experiments on benchmark datasets
and notice that our high-confidence perturbations may have certain adversarial universality.
2 Method
2.1 Perturbation-Manifold Based Influence Measure
Given an input image x and a DCNN classifier N with parameters θ, the prediction probability
for class y ∈ {1, . . . ,K} is denoted by P (y|x,θ) = Nθ(y,x). Let ω = (ω1, . . . , ωm)T be a
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Figure 1: Flowchart of our proposed framework.
perturbation vector in an open set Ω ⊆ Rm, which can be imposed on any subvector of (xT ,θT )T .
Let the prediction probability under perturbationω be P (y|x,θ,ω) with P (y|x,θ,ω0) = P (y|x,θ).
For sensitivity analysis of DCNNs, Shu and Zhu [25] recently have proposed an FI measure to
delineate the ‘intrinsic’ perturbed change of the objective function on the Riemannian manifold
of M = {P (y|x,θ,ω) : ω ∈ Ω} [33, 34]. In contrast with traditional Euclidean-space based
measures such as Jacobian norm [21] and Cook’s local influence measure [4], this perturbation-
manifold based measure enjoys the desirable invariance property under diffeomorphic (e.g., scaling)
reparameterizations of perturbations and has better numerical performance in detecting vulnerable
images and pixels.
Let f(ω) be an objective function of interest, for example, the cross-entropy f(ω) = − logP (y =
ytrue|x,θ,ω). The FI measure at ω = ω0 is defined by
FIω(ω0) = [∂ωf(ω0)]G†ω(ω0)[∂ωf(ω0)]
T , (1)
where ∂ω = (∂/∂ω1, . . . , ∂/∂ωp), Gω(ω) =
∑K
k=1 ∂
T
ω`(ω|y,x,θ)∂ω`(ω|y,x,θ)P (y|x,θ,ω)
with `(ω|y,x,θ) = logP (y|x,θ,ω), andG†ω(ω0) is the pseudoinverse ofGω(ω0). A larger value
of FIω(ω0) indicates that the DCNN model is more sensitive in f(ω) to local perturbation ω around
ω0. We shall use the FI measure to discover vulnerable images or pixels for adversarial attacks.
2.2 Particle Swarm Optimization
Since introduced by Kennedy and Eberhart [9] in 1995, the PSO algorithm has been successfully used
in solving complex optimization problems in various fields of engineering and science [23, 5, 32].
Let fA be an objective function, which will be specified in Section 2.3 for adversarial scenarios. The
PSO algorithm performs searching via a population (called swarm) of candidate solutions (called
particles) by iterations to optimize the objective function fA. Specifically, let
pti,best = arg min
k=1,...,t
fA(ω
k
i ), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Np}, (2)
gtbest = arg min
i=1,...,Np
fA(p
t
i,best), (3)
where ωki = (ω
k
i1, . . . , ω
k
im)
T is the position of particle i in an m-dimensional space at iteration k,
Np is the total number of particles, and t is the current iteration. The position, ωt+1i , of particle i at
iteration (t + 1) is updated with a velocity vt+1i = (v
t+1
i1 , . . . , v
t+1
im ) by
vt+1i = wv
t
i + c1r1(p
t
i,best − ωti) + c2r2(gtbest − ωti),
ωt+1i = ω
t
i + v
t+1
i ,
(4)
where w is the inertia weight, c1 and c2 are acceleration coefficients, and r1 and r2 are uniformly
distributed random variables in the range [0, 1]. Following [30], we fix w = 0.6 and c1 = c2 = 2.
We can see that the movement of each particle is guided by its individual best known position and the
entire swarm’s best known position. We shall use the PSO algorithm to obtain desirable adversarial
perturbations under various user’s requirements.
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2.3 Adversarial Image Generation
Given an image x, we combine FI and PSO to generate its adversarial image with user-customized
options for the number of pixels for perturbation, the misclassification probability, and the targeted
class to which the image is misclassified, denoted by m, Perr, and ytarget, respectively.
Denote image x = (x1, . . . , xp)T . For an RGB image of q pixels, we view the three channel
components of a pixel as three separate pixels, so p = 3q here. We let the default value of m = p.
We first locate m vulnerable pixels in x for perturbation, if m is specified but the targeted pixels are
not given by the user. We compute the FI measure in (1) for each pixel i ∈ {1, . . . , p} based on the
objective function
f(ω) =
{− logP (ytrue|x,θ,ω), if ytarget is not given,
− logP (ytarget|x,θ,ω), otherwise, (5)
where ω = ∆xi. Denote x(i) to be the pixel with the i-th largest FI value. We use x(1), . . . , x(m) as
the m pixels for adversarial attack and let perturbationω = (ω1, . . . , ωm)T = (∆x(1), . . . ,∆x(m))T .
We then apply the PSO algorithm in (2) and (4) to obtain an optimal value of ω that minimizes the
adversarial objective function
fA(ω) = af0(ω) + b‖ω‖2, ωi ∈ ε · (0− x(i), 1− x(i)),
where we assume xi ∈ [0, 1], ε constrains the range of perturbation to guarantee the visual quality of
the generated adversarial image compared to the original, f0(ω) is a misclassification loss function,
‖ω‖2 represents the magnitude of perturbation, and a and b are prespecified weights. To ensure the
misleading nature of the generated adversarial sample, a b is set to prioritize f0(ω) over ‖ω‖2.
We use different f0(ω) functions to meet different user-customized requirements on {m,Perr, ytarget}.
If only m is known, inspired by [13, 14], we let the misclassification loss function be
f0(ω) =
{|P (y1|x,θ,ω)− P (y2|x,θ,ω)| , if y1 = ytrue,
0, if y1 6= ytrue,
where yk is the label with the k-th largest prediction probability P (y = yk|x,θ,ω) from the trained
DCNN for the input image x added with perturbation ω. Since y1 6= ytrue results in the minimum
of f0(ω), this loss function encourages PSO to yield a valid perturbation. If the ω-perturbed x is
prespecified with a misclassification probability Perr ≥ 0.5, we use the misclassification loss function
f0(ω) =
{|P (y2|x,θ,ω)− Perr| , if y1 = ytrue,
|P (y1|x,θ,ω)− Perr| , if y1 6= ytrue.
Later in our experiments, we show that high Perr is helpful to generate universal adversarial perturba-
tions applicable to images from the other classes. If a targeted class ytarget is given, we choose the
misclassification loss function
f0(ω) =
{|P (y1|x,θ,ω)− P (ytarget|x,θ,ω)| , if y1 6= ytarget,
0, if y1 = ytarget.
Furthermore, if both Perr and ytarget are provided, we use
f0(ω) =
{|P (y1|x,θ,ω)− P (ytarget|x,θ,ω)| , if y1 6= ytarget,
|P (y1|x,θ,ω)− Perr| , if y1 = ytarget.
or equivalently f0(ω) = |P (ytarget|x,θ,ω)− Perr|.
Our procedure for generating a customized adversarial image is illustrated in Figure 1 (b)-(e) and
also summarized in Algorithm 1.
2.4 Adversarial Training
We aim to create a set of adversarial images for a given trained DCNN model, and then fine-tune the
model on the training data augmented with this adversarial dataset. To include as many adversarial
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Algorithm 1 Adversarial image generation
Input: Image and label {x, ytrue}, number of perturbed pixels m, (optional) indices of perturbed
pixels, (optional) misclassification probability Perr, (optional) targeted incorrect label ytarget,
hyperparameters {Np, a, b, ε} in PSO, and maximum iteration number T
1: If perturbed pixels are not specified, compute FI by (1) and (5) for all pixels to locate the m
pixels for perturbation ω;
2: Initialize Np particles in PSO with positions {{p0i,best = ω0i }Npi=1, g0best} and velocities {v0i }Npi=1;
3: Repeat
4: for particle i = 1, . . . , Np do
5: Update vti and ω
t
i by (4);
6: Update pti,best by (2);
7: end for
8: Update gtbest by (3);
9: Until convergence or iteration t = T
Output: Adversarial image (x+ zero-padded ω), where ω = gtbest.
images as possible, we do not specify a value to Perr in Algorithm 1. Note that Algorithm 1 may
not have a feasible solution when given with restrictive parameters such as small ε or small Np. To
efficiently generate a batch of adversarial images, we first select a set of potentially vulnerable images
by some modifications to Algorithm 1.
Specifically, given an image dataset X = {xi}ni=1, thresholds {FIimg, Ptarget,FIpixel} and targeted
incorrect labels {yi,target}ni=1 (if not given, yi,target = yi,2 the label with the second largest prediction
probability), we first find X˜ , the set of all correctly classified images that have image-level FI (with
ω = ∆xi) ≥ FIimg and prediction probability P (yi,target|xi,θ) ≥ Ptarget. For each image in set X˜ ,
we generate its adversarial image by Algorithm 1 in which m is the number of pixels with FI≥ FIpixel
and ytarget is specified to yi,target. These generated adversarial images form an adversarial dataset. The
whole procedure of our adversarial training is illustrated in Figure 1 and detailed in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Adversarial dataset generation
Input: Image set X = {xi}ni=1 and labels {yi,true}ni=1, thresholds {FIimg, Ptarget,FIpixel}, targeted
incorrect labels {yi,target}ni=1, and hyperparameters {Np, a, b, ε, T} in Algorithm 1
1: For each correctly classified xi ∈ X , compute the image-level FI (denoted by FIi) by (1) with
ω = ∆xi and f(ω) = − logP (y = yi,true|xi,θ,ω);
2: Determine X˜ = {xi ∈ X : FIi ≥ FIimg, P (yi,target|xi,θ) ≥ Ptarget};
3: For each xi ∈ X˜ , generate its adversarial image xai by Algorithm 1 with m = # of pixels with
FI ≥ FIpixel and ytarget = yi,target.
Output: Adversarial dataset X˜a = {xai }|X˜|i=1
3 Experiments
We conduct experiments on the two benchmark datasets MNIST and CIFAR10 using the ResNet32
model [7]. Data augmentation is used, including random horizontal and vertical shifts up to 12.5% of
image height and width for both datasets, and additionally random horizontal flip for CIFAR10 data.
Table 1 shows the prediction accuracy of our trained ResNet32 for the two datasets.
Table 1: Accuracy of original and adversarial trained ResNet32 models
MNIST CIFAR10
Model Training (n=60k) Testing (n=10k) Training (n=50k) Testing (n=10k)
Original 99.76% 99.25% 98.82% 91.28%
Adversarial 99.68% 99.32% 99.10% 91.32%
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3.1 Customized Adversarial Image Generation
We consider two images with easy visual detection and large image-level FI in MNIST and CIFAR10,
shown in Figures 2 and 3 with prediction-probability graphs and pixel-level FI maps. The probability
bar graphs imply candidate misclassification classes that can be used as ytarget. The FI maps indicate
the vulnerability of each pixel to local perturbation and are useful to locate pixels for attack.
We first evaluate the performance of Algorithm 1 (cf. Figure 1 (b)-(e)) in generating adversarial
examples of the two images according to different requirements on m, Perr and ytarget. Figures 4 and
5 show the generated adversarial images with corresponding perturbation maps. Perturbations 1-3
consider the settings with m = 1, 3, and 7, respectively, and with no specifications to Perr and ytarget.
For Perturbations 4-6, we only specify Perr = 0.5, 0.75, and 0.99, respectively, assign no value to
ytarget, and tunem being the number of pixels with FI> FIpixel ∈ {0.1, 1} andNp ∈ {200, 500, 1000}
to obtain feasible solutions from PSO. Perturbations 7-9 are prespecified with ytarget = 0, 2, and 4 for
MNIST, and 0, 4, and 5 for CIFAR10, respectively, m being the number of pixels with FI > 0.1, and
no value for Perr. The detailed parameter settings for Algorithm 1 are provided in Supplementary
Material. We can see that the generated adversarial images have visually negligible differences from
the originals and satisfy the prespecified requirements.
We also investigate the adversarial universality of Perturbation 6 shown in Figures 4 and 5, which have
99% prediction probability to Class 4. Table 2 shows the proportions of original correctly-classified
images that are misclassified after added with the perturbations. The MNIST dataset has error rates at
least 14.3% for all classes and some up to 100%, with a total rate above 87.5% in both training and
testing sets. In particular, a remarkably large proportion of each class are misclassfied to Class 4 with
a total rate of 62.2% and 64.5% for training and testing sets. Perturbation 6 for CIFAR10 also exhibits
a certain extent of adversarial universality with non-targeted total error rates 3.92% and 6.19% and
Class-4-targeted total rates 0.92% and 1.32% for training and testing sets, respectively. Figure 6
displays images from the other nine classes that are originally correctly classified with high probability
but are misclassified (most with high probability) to Class 4 after added with Perturbation 6. These
results indicate that our method may generate a universal adversarial perturbation, which particularly
has the potential to misclassify images from different classes to the same specific class. The existence
of universal adversarial perturbations may be attributed to the geometric correlations of decision
boundaries between classes [15]. An adversarial perturbation with very high confidence may have
salient features of its resulting class and thus it may have strong power to drag other different images
towards the decision boundary.
(a) Original (b) Prob. bar (c) FI (y=6) (d) FI (y=0) (e) FI (y=2) (f) FI (y=4)
Figure 2: Pixel-level FI maps of an MNIST image for different target classes.
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(a) Original (b) Prob. bar
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Figure 3: Pixel-level FI maps of a CIFAR10 image’s RGB channels for different target classes. Class
labels: (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9) = (plane, car, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse, ship, truck).
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Class:6
Figure 4: Adversarial examples of an MNIST image. Perturbations 1-3 are set with m = 1, 3 and 7,
respectively; Perturbations 4-6 are with Perr = 0.5, 0.75 and 0.99, respectively; Perturbations 7-9 are
with ytarget = 0, 2 and 4, respectively. Perturbation maps are followed by resulting adversarial images.
Class:2
Figure 5: Adversarial examples of a CIFAR10 image. Perturbations 1-3 are set with m = 1, 3 and 7
attacked pixels (framed in the attacked channel’s color), respectively. Perturbations 4-6 are set with
Perr = 0.5, 0.75 and 0.99, respectively. Perturbations 7-9 are set with ytarget = 0, 4 and 5, respectively.
Perturbation maps are followed by resulting adversarial images.
Table 2: Proportions (in %) of original correctly-classified images that are misclassified after added
with Perturbations 6 in Figures 4 and 5.
True Class 0 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 Total
MNIST Misclassifed 92.9 100 99.3 91.1 96.0 92.3 100 15.3 99.9 87.7
Training Misclass. to 4 81.1 36.9 55.8 84.3 75.5 49.6 95.3 14.2 68.8 62.2
MNIST Misclassifed 91.7 100 99.4 94.4 97.9 91.1 100 14.3 100 87.9
Testing Misclass. to 4 79.7 37.3 58.8 88.3 78.5 57.4 94.8 13.7 75.0 64.5
CIFAR10 Misclassifed 8.46 2.74 2.90 7.27 5.77 0.42 4.82 2.07 1.00 3.92
Training Misclass. to 4 1.27 0.04 0.89 1.65 1.45 0.12 2.56 0.30 0.06 0.92
CIFAR10 Misclassifed 11.2 5.62 6.27 12.36 8.29 0.94 6.81 3.05 2.61 6.19
Testing Misclass. to 4 2.17 0.10 1.48 2.52 2.34 0.31 2.81 0.32 0.21 1.32
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(a) MNIST
(b) CIFAR10
Figure 6: Results of universal adversarial perturbations (Perturbations 6 in Figures 4 and 5).
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3.2 Adversarial Training
We consider using Algorithm 2 to generate adversarial datasets for adversarial training. Figure 7
shows the Manhattan plots of image-level FIs for correctly classified images and Figure 8 presents
the heatmaps of confusion matrices. We can see that the distributions of image-level FIs and the
patterns of misclassifications are very close between training and test datasets in both MNIST and
CIFAR10. Hence, our adversarial training is expected to be useful for unseen adversarial examples
generated from similar mechanisms in testing.
Based on the two figures, for selecting vulnerable images (cf. Figure 1(a)), we let FIimg = 0.2, yi,target
be the most frequent misclassified class of xi’s true class, and Ptarget = 0.2 in Algorithm 2 . The
resulting image set X˜ is likely to be near the decision boundaries of the trained classifier. We then set
FIpixel = 0.1 in the algorithm. We generate adversarial datasets Adv1 (n = 136) and Adv2 (n = 26),
respectively, from training and testing sets of MNIST, and Adv3 (n = 244) and Adv4 (n = 146)
from those of CIFAR10. Adv1 and Adv3 are used for adversarial training (cf. Figure 1(f)), whereas
Adv2 and Adv4 test the adversarial trained models. The detailed parameter settings for Algorithm 2
to generate those datasets are given in Supplementary Material.
The adversarial trained ResNet32 models are trained from the original trained models on the training
data augmented with Adv1 and Adv3, respectively, for additional 30 epochs for MNIST and 50 epochs
for CIFAR10. The results of adversarial training are reported in Tables 1 and 3. Since the adversarial
datasets (n ≤ 244) are much smaller than original testing datasets (n = 10k) and the original trained
models already have high accuracy, the results in Tables 1 are only slightly improved on the test
datasets. However, in Table 3, the adversarial training on Adv1 and Adv3 indeed benefits the defense
of the fine-tuned ResNet32 models against adversarial attacks. The accuracy is dramatically improved
from 0.00% to 83.82% and 88.93% on Adv1 and Adv3, respectively, and also up to 76.92% and
63.01% on test-data derived Adv2 and Adv4, respectively. We also observe an increase of 0.27%
and 0.94%, respectively, in accuracy on combined data of original test set and its adversarial samples
for MNIST and CIFAR10. These results indicate that our approach can significantly improve the
adversarial defense of DCNN classifiers.
Figure 7: Manhattan plots of image-level FIs for correctly classified images.
Figure 8: Heatmaps of confusion matrices.
Table 3: Accuracy of original and adversarial trained ResNet32 models on adversarial datasets
MNIST CIFAR10
Model Adv1 Tr.+Adv1 Adv2 Ts.+Adv2 Adv3 Tr.+Adv3 Adv4 Ts.+Adv4
(n=136) (n=60k+136) (n=26) (n=10k+26) (n=244) (n=50k+244) (n=146) (n=10k+146)
Original 0.00% 99.53% 0.00% 98.99% 0.00% 98.34% 0.00% 89.97%
Adversarial 83.82% 99.64% 76.92% 99.26% 88.93% 99.05% 63.01% 90.91%
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4 Conclusion
This paper introduced an FI-and-PSO based framework for adversarial image generation and training
for DCNN classifiers by accounting for the user specified number of perturbed pixels, misclassifi-
cation probability, and/or targeted incorrect class. We used the perturbation-based FI measure to
efficiently detect the vulnerable images and pixels to increase the attack success rate. We designed
different misclassification loss functions to meet various user’s specifications and obtained the optimal
perturbation by the fast PSO algorithm. Experiments showed good performance of our approach in
generating customized adversarial samples and associated adversarial training for DCNNs.
Broader Impact
DCNN models for image classification are widely used in various real-world applications such as
self-driving cars and face recognition for identification, but they can be vulnerable to adversarial
attacks with small perturbations to original images, resulting in safety and security concerns in the
above mentioned applications. Our proposed white-box framework for adversarial image generation
and training for DCNN classifiers may help developers to test and fortify their DCNN-based products
to improve reliability in the real-world applications.
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